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Abstract—In pay-TV, a service provider offers TV programs and channels to users. To ensure that only authorized users gain access,
conditional access systems (CAS) have been proposed. In existing CAS, users disclose to the service provider the TV programs and
channels they purchase. We propose a pay-per-view and a pay-per-channel CAS that protect users’ privacy. Our pay-per-view CAS
employs priced oblivious transfer (POT) to allow a user to purchase TV programs without disclosing which programs were bought to the
service provider. In our pay-per-channel CAS, POT is employed together with broadcast attribute-based encryption (BABE) to achieve
low storage overhead, collusion resistance, efficient revocation and broadcast efficiency. We propose a new POT scheme and show its
feasibility by implementing and testing our CAS on a representative mobile platform.
Index Terms—ADP-PPRO, ADP-APPS, APC-MMED
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1 INTRODUCTION
In pay-TV, a service provider offers TV programs and
channels to users. To ensure that only authorized users
gain access, conditional access systems (CAS) have been
proposed [1], [2]. CAS can implement pay-per-channel,
where users subscribe to channels or groups of channels
for a period of time, or pay-per-view, where users pay for
individual TV programs. In flexible pay-per-channel [3],
users can subscribe to any combination of channels and
change their subscription during the subscription period.
A CAS should provide some functionalities and security
properties [4]. Fine-grained access control is required to ensure
that only authorized users can get access. For example, it
should be possible to apply access control policies that deny
access to underage users. As in any commercial transac-
tion, non-repudiation is necessary to solve disputes. Back-
ward secrecy ensures that revoked users cannot get access.
Additionally, a CAS should be efficient, which involves
efficient transmission, low storage overhead, and efficient
key redistribution when users are revoked or change their
subscription.
Traditional CAS can roughly be divided into two classes:
group key based symmetric schemes and public key based
schemes. In group key based schemes [1], [3], [5], [6], [7],
users in the same group share a group key. To transmit
a video to users in different groups, the service provider
determines which group keys should be used and encrypts
the video employing those keys. Group key based schemes
offer efficient broadcast transmission. However, they suffer
collusion attacks, lack of non-repudiation, and inefficient
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key distribution [4]. Public key based schemes [8], [9] offer
non-repudiation, lighter storage overhead and efficient key
redistribution. However, transmission is inefficient and fine-
grained access control is difficult to implement.
Recently, two CAS which enjoy both efficient broadcast
transmission and the security guarantees of public key
based schemes have been proposed for pay-TV [10] and
mobile pay-TV [4]. They are based on attribute-based en-
cryption (ABE) [11], [12]. The scheme in [4] is compatible
with the digital video broadcast standard DVB-H1 and DVB-
SH2. However, as explained in Section 2, these CAS have
shortcomings.
To the best of our knowledge, user privacy has not been
considered in existing CAS. Currently, in pay-per-channel,
users disclose to the service provider the channels to which
they subscribe, and in pay-per-view, they disclose the TV
programs they purchase. This may reveal users’ sensitive
information, such as political views, religious beliefs and
sexual orientation.
Our Contribution. We propose a pay-per-view and a pay-
per-channel CAS that protect users’ privacy. Both CAS
employ priced oblivious transfer (POT) [13] in order to
allow the user to purchase channels and programs without
disclosing which channels and programs were bought to the
service provider. POT employs a prepayment mechanism,
where the user makes an initial deposit and, at each pur-
chase, subtracts the price paid from the deposit without the
service provider learning the price paid or the new value of
the deposit.
In our pay-per-channel CAS, POT is employed together
with broadcast attribute-based encryption (BABE) [14],
which allows our CAS to enjoy low storage overhead, collu-
sion resistance, efficient revocation and broadcast efficiency.
With respect to the CAS in [4], our CAS employs an efficient
direct revocation method in which non-revoked users do
1. http://www.dvb.org/standards/dvb-h
2. http://www.dvb.org/standards/dvb-sh
2not perform any operation. With respect to the CAS in [10],
our CAS avoids the use of an ad-hoc revocation method
based on an expiration time attribute, which, as explained
in Section 2, requires a large ciphertext size.
To show the feasibility of our approach, we propose
a new POT scheme. Our POT scheme is similar to the
scheme in [15], but replaces the signature scheme employed
there by a structure-preserving signature scheme [16], which
allows to shorten the ciphertext size. We implement both
our pay-per-view and a pay-per-channel CAS and show
performance measurements in an ARM Cortex-A8 processor
core. Our results demonstrate that our approach can be
deployed in practical settings even when using platforms
from early-generation mobile devices.
Outline of the paper. In Section 2, we describe and analyze
related work. In Section 3, we describe our model for CAS
and its properties. In Section 4, we describe the concepts
of priced oblivious transfer and broadcast attribute-based
encryption. We describe our pay-per-channel and our pay-
per-view CAS in Section 5 and Section 6 respectively. We
discuss their properties in Section 7. In Section 8, we propose
a new priced oblivious transfer scheme. In Section 9, we
analyze the efficiency of our CAS. We describe an imple-
mentation and performance measurements of both BABE
and POT schemes. We conclude in Section 10.
2 RELATED WORK
The group key based CAS described in the DVB standard3
consists of four layers: registration, rights management, key
stream and traffic encryption. In the registration layer, the
user’s device is given several decryption keys for authen-
tication and broadcast decryption purposes. In the rights
management layer, the service provider determines the
inferred encryption key (IEK) that is used to encrypt the
service encryption key (SEK). The choice of IEK depends on
which devices should receive the SEK, i.e., on which users
have subscribed for a particular channel. Zero message
broadcast encryption [17] is employed to encrypt the right
object (RO), which contains the SEK, on input the IEK. In
the key stream layer, the SEK is used to encrypt the traffic
encryption key TEK. In the traffic encryption layer, the TEK
is used to encrypt the video content. The TEK is updated
frequently, e.g., every second.
The DVB CAS, as well as other group key based CAS [1],
[3], [5], [6], [7], suffers from lack of non-repudiation and in-
efficient key distribution. Furthermore, for security reasons,
the size of the groups should be small, thus reducing the ad-
vantage of broadcast encryption efficiency. Public key based
CAS [8], [9] employ inefficient one to one transmission and
hinder fine-grained access control.
The CAS proposed in [4] is based on the key-policy
attribute-based encryption scheme (KP-ABE) in [12]. The
key stream and traffic encryption layers remain unchanged
from the DVB standard. During registration, each user ob-
tains a KP-ABE key that binds her to a subscribers cate-
gory and to other attributes, such as her age. The rights
management layer works as follows. To encrypt the RO, the
service provider employs KP-ABE. Each KP-ABE ciphertext
3. http://www.dvb.org/standards/dvb-h
is associated to a category and to an age rating, such that
only users with the right category and age can decrypt it
and get the RO. In order to revoke a user, a mechanism in
which all the users but the revoked user update their KP-
ABE keys is proposed, which is inefficient.
The CAS proposed in [10] is based on ciphertext policy
attribute set based encryption (ASBE). The key stream and
traffic encryption layers remain unchanged from the DVB
standard. During registration, each user obtains an ASBE
key for attributes of the form (channel, start, end), where
channel identifies a channel, and start and end denote the
start and end dates of the subscription. In ASBE, the at-
tributes have a hierarchy, so that the attributes start and
end of a channel cannot be used for other channels. In
the rights management layer, to encrypt the RO, the user
employs a policy (channel, ≤ starttime, ≥ endtime), i.e., the
start and end attributes of the user should be lower and
greater than the starttime and endtime attributes in the policy.
This mechanism is inefficient and also needs key updates.
The problems of the CAS in [4] and [10] can be solved
by using attribute-based encryption with revocation. An
ABE with revocation scheme was first proposed in [18]. As
described in [19], there are two main revocation methods:
direct and indirect. Indirect revocation does not require
the senders to know the revocation list, but it requires the
keys of non-revoked users to be updated. Direct revocation
requires the sender to know the revocation list but no key
updates are needed. Therefore, direct revocation is more
suitable for a CAS, where the service provider is the only
sender and already knows the revocation list. We employ
the ABE with direct revocation proposed in [14] in our CAS.
We summarize now recent progress in ABE applicable
to the construction of CAS. In [20], a more efficient ABE
with direct revocation scheme is proposed. The ABE with
direct revocation schemes in [14] and [20] are selectively
secure but, in [21], a fully-secure one is presented. In [22],
a forward-secure ABE scheme is shown. This scheme gives
protection against key exposure and is adequate for settings
where the provider does not know the revocation list. Oth-
erwise, ABE with direct revocation is better suited because it
avoids key updates. In [23] (resp. [24]), an ABE scheme with
white-box (resp. black-box) traceability is presented, which
allows one to identify users that leak their secret keys (resp.
their decryption box).
Other recent works on CAS include an authentica-
tion and subscription protocol between the provider and
users [25] and a CAS for portable devices based on se-
lective encryption that provides interoperability between
providers [26].
To the best of our knowledge, there is no CAS that
protects user privacy. POT was proposed in [13]. Existing
POT schemes offer different security levels: half-simulation
security [13], full-simulation security [27], and universal
composability [15]. We propose a new universally compos-
able POT scheme that shortens the ciphertext size of the
scheme in [15].
Oblivious transfer with access control (OTAC) [28], [29]
allows the service provider to enforce access control policies
in OT protocols. Some OTAC schemes are based on com-
bining OT with ABE [30], [31]. Although POT can be seen
as a form of oblivious transfer with access control, OTAC
3schemes do not allow for an efficient implementation of
POT. The reason is that, in OTAC schemes, a user possesses
some attributes that are certified only once by a credential
issuer, while in POT, the user account is an attribute that
changes each time the user makes a purchase in a way
that depends on the item purchased. Therefore, existing
OTAC schemes cannot be applied without modification to
construct a privacy-preserving CAS. We note that some
OTAC schemes also hide the access control policy from the
user [32], but this is not necessary in our case since the price
of a channel or program should be public.
3 DEFINITION OF OUR CONDITIONAL ACCESS
SYSTEM
3.1 Pay-Per-Channel CAS
Our pay-per-channel conditional access system (PPC-CAS)
is run by a provider P and users U and consists of a
registration layer, a rights management layer, a key stream
layer and a traffic encryption layer, which we describe in
Figure 1. The last two layers work as in the DVB standard,
which we summarize in Section 2.
In the registration layer, at setup, the provider creates
public parameters and a master secret key. After that, a
user and the provider run a protocol by means of which the
user obtains right objects that contain parts of a secret key
associated with the user’s identity and attributes. The user
attributes are TV channels for which the user subscribes.
The user obtains her secret key without revealing to the
provider the TV channels she subscribes for, while still
paying the right price for the subscription. Each right object
is associated with an access control policy that describes a
rating (i.e., an age restriction) for a TV channel, so that a user
cannot subscribe for a channel whose rating is not adequate
for the user’s age.
In the rights management layer, the provider receives
as input a SEK, an attribute associated with a TV channel
and a revocation list. The provider encrypts the SEK under
the identities of non-revoked subscribers and under the
attribute.
A PPC-CAS should fulfill the following security proper-
ties.
Privacy. No coalition of parties, which can include the
provider, must be able to learn the TV channels for which a
user subscribes.
Revocation. P must have the ability to end the subscription
of a user when it expires or when it must be terminated
because of misbehavior. A revoked user must not be able to
access channels for which her subscription is revoked.
Collusion Resistance. A group of colluding users (which
could include revoked users) must not be able to access
channels that none of them is able to access individually.
Non repudiation. Non repudiation is an important property
when a dispute between P and U occurs. It requires that P
should be able to prove that U made a subscription if U did
make the subscription, while U should be able to prove that
she has made the corresponding payment if U did make the
payment. When there is a dispute between P and U , they
can ask a trusted adjudicator to resolve it.
These security properties must hold against an active
adversary. The adversary controls the network and is able to
Fig. 1. Pay-Per-Channel Conditional Access System
TABLE 1
Table of Abbreviations
ABE Attribute-Based Encryption
ASBE Attribute Set Based Encryption
BABE Broadcast Attribute-Based Encryption
CAS Conditional Access System
CNF Conjuntive Normal Form
DBV-H Digital Video Broadcasting - Handheld
DBV-SH DVB - Satellite services to Handhelds
DNF Disjunctive Normal Form
IEK Inferred Encryption Key
KP-ABE Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
OT Oblivious Transfer
OTAC Oblivious Transfer with Access Control
P Provider
POT Priced Oblivious Transfer
PPC-CAS Pay-Per-Channel CAS
PPV-CAS Pay-Per-View CAS
RO Right Object
SEK Service Encryption Key
TEK Traffic Encryption Key
U User
eavesdrop, delay and modify messages exchanged between
parties. In addition, the adversary is allowed to corrupt
parties and control their behavior.
Throughout this paper, we use several abbreviations.
They are summarized in Table 1.
3.2 Pay-Per-View CAS
Our pay-per-view conditional access system (PPV-CAS) is
run by a provider P and users U and consists of a rights
management layer, a key stream layer and a traffic encryp-
tion layer, which we describe in Figure 2. The last two
layers work as in the DVB standard, which we summarize
in Section 2.
In the rights management layer, the provider gets as
input, for each TV program, a right object RO and an access
control policy that describes the age rating. The user inputs
as attributes its age and a TV program of her choice. The
provider and the user run a protocol by means of which
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the user decrypts the right object associated with the TV
program of her choice without revealing the TV program
to the provider. A right object contains the SEK needed to
decrypt a TV program.
A PPV-CAS should fulfill the properties of privacy,
collusion-resistance, and non-repudiation defined in Sec-
tion 3.1. In our PPV-CAS, the SEK is only valid for the
duration of a TV program and there are no long term keys,
so revocation is less necessary.
4 BUILDING BLOCKS
4.1 Broadcast Attribute-Based Encryption
Let U be the set of all user indexes and S be the set of all
attributes. Let Q be the set of all policies that are allowed
over S. We denote by A  P the fact that a set of attributes A
satisfies the policy P.
We use broadcast ciphertext policy attribute based en-
cryption (BABE) [14], where the secret key of a user is
associated with a user index id and to a set of attributes
A, and a ciphertext is associated to a set of user indexes I
and to a policy P. A BABE scheme consists of the following
algorithms:
• Setup(1k ). On input the security parameter 1k , output
the public parameters par and a master secret key msk .
• KeyGen(par ,msk , id ,A). On input the parameters par ,
the master secret key msk , the user index id ∈ U and
the set of attributes A ∈ S, output a secret key sk(id ,A)
for the user index id and the attributes A.
• Enc(par , I,P,m). On input the parameters par , the user
index set I ∈ U, the policy P ∈ Q, and the message m ,
output a ciphertext ct(I,P).
• Dec(par , sk(id ,A), ct(I,P)). On input the parameters
par , a secret key sk(id ,P) and a ciphertext ct(I,A),
output a message m if id ∈ I and if A  P.
In the rights management layer of a our pay-per-channel
CAS, users are assigned a user identifier id , and the set of
attributes of a user will be the set of TV channels to which
the user subscribes. When a user subscribes to a new TV
channel, it must be possible to add the associated TV chan-
nel attribute to an existing secret key. For this purpose, we
split up the algorithm KeyGen into two algorithms KeyGen0
and KeyGen1.
• KeyGen0(par ,msk , id). On input the parameters par ,
the master secret key msk , and the user index id ∈ U,
output a secret key part sk(id) for the user index id and
auxiliary information aux.
• KeyGen1(aux, s). On input the auxiliary information
aux and the attribute s , output a secret key part sk(s).
Therefore, a secret key for the user index id ∈ U and
the set of attributes A ∈ S is computed by first running
(sk(id), aux)← KeyGen0(par ,msk , id) and, for each s ∈ A,
sk(s) ← KeyGen1(aux, s), and then setting sk(id ,A) ←
(sk(id), 〈sk(s)〉∀s∈A). The algorithm KeyGen of the broad-
cast ciphertext policy attribute based encryption in [14] can
be split up into KeyGen0 and KeyGen1. We summarize the
symbols used for BABE in Table 2 (left).
4.2 Priced Oblivious Transfer
Priced oblivious transfer (POT) is a two-party protocol that
provides privacy in e-commerce of digital goods by hiding
from the vendor which items are bought. More formally,
a provider P sells a set of messages (m1, . . . ,mN ) with
prices (p1, . . . , pN ) to a user U . At each purchase, U chooses
i ∈ {1, . . . ,N }, gets mi and pays pi . The following security
properties must hold.
Provider security. For any message mi bought by U , U must
pay a price pi . U must not learn any information about
messages that U has not bought.
User privacy. For any message mi , when U buys mi , P
learns nothing about mi or pi .
POT schemes usually employ a prepaid mechanism. A
user pays an initial deposit to the provider. When a user
buys a message, the price of the message is subtracted from
the deposit. The provider learns neither the price of the
message bought nor the new value of the user’s account,
but the provider has the guarantee that the new account
value is correct and that a user cannot buy a message if the
account value is lower than the message price.
A POT scheme consist of an initialization phase, a pay-
ment phase, a request phase and a sell phase, and it is pa-
rameterized by a message spaceM, a number of messages
N , a universe of prices Upr and a universe of accounts Uac.
The initialization phase consists of the algorithms InitP and
InitU.
• InitP(1k ,m1, p1, . . . ,mN , pN ). On input the security pa-
rameter 1k , the messages (m1, . . . ,mN ) and the prices
(p1, . . . , pN ), output state information stp for P and a
message Minit to be sent to U .
• InitU(1k ,Minit). On input the security parameter 1k and
the message Minit , output state information stu for U
and prices (p1, . . . , pN ).
The payment phase consists of the algorithms PayP and
PayU.
• PayU(stu , p). On input state information stu and pay-
ment p, output a payment message Mpay and updated
state information stu .
• PayP(stp ,Mpay). On input state information stp and
message Mpay , output updated state information stp and
payment p.
The request phase consists of the algorithms ReqP and
ReqU.
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i , output state information stu and message Mreq to be
sent to P .
• ReqP(stp ,Mreq). On input state information stp and
message Mreq , output updated state information stp .
The request phase consists of the algorithms SellP and
SellU.
• SellP(stp). On input state information stp , output up-
dated state information stp and message Msell to be sent
to U .
• SellU(stu ,Msell). On input state information stu , output
updated state information stu and message mi .
We summarize the symbols used for POT in Table 2 (right).
5 PAY-PER-CHANNEL CAS
We describe a mobile pay-per-channel conditional access
system (PPC-CAS). The key stream and traffic encryption
layers remain as in the DVB standard. We thus describe a
protocol for the registration and rights management layer
of our PPC-CAS.
The service encryption key (SEK) of a TV channel is
updated periodically, e.g., every week. The user U purchases
a subscription to a TV channel by running a priced oblivious
transfer protocol (POT) with the provider P . The right object
RO for a TV channel, which the user U receives as output
of the POT protocol, contains a key that allows the user to
obtain the SEK each time the provider P updates the SEK.
The provider P employs broadcast ciphertext-policy at-
tribute based encryption (BABE) in order to release updates
of the SEK. The reason why P employs BABE is threefold.
First, it is more efficient than purchasing the SEK each time
it is updated by employing the POT protocol. Second, BABE
allows for efficient revocation. When a user is revoked,
the provider simply removes the user identifier id from
the set I used to compute the ciphertext that encrypts the
updated SEK. Third, the user secret key of a BABE scheme
can be stored in a tamper-resistant element of the mobile
device in order to prevent the user from sharing her keys.
This is possible thanks to the fact that the key sk(id ,A)
can be split up into (sk(id), 〈sk(s)〉∀s∈A). The key part
sk(id), which depends only on the user identifier id , can
be stored permanently in a tamper-resistance element. The
key parts 〈sk(s)〉∀s∈A, which are purchased through the
POT protocol, are useless without sk(id). We note that the
collusion resistance property of the BABE scheme ensures
that users cannot combine their keys to produce a key for
more attributes.
The protocol for the registration layer of our PPC-CAS
consists of a setup phase, an initialization phase, a payment
phase, and a purchase phase. The rights management layer
consists of a SEK update phase and a revocation phase. We
depict them in Figure 3.
Setup Phase. P runs (par ,msk)← Setup(1k ). P keeps msk
and publishes par .
Initialization Phase. The user U receives as input a certified
age age . The provider P receives as input a list of right
objects RO. Each right object ROi contains a channel at-
tribute si , a price pi and a rating rt i . The rating indicates the
minimum age age a user must have in order to be allowed
to subscribe to a TV channel. The interaction between U and
P is as follows:
• P assigns an identifier id to the user U and runs (sk(id),
aux) ← KeyGen0(par ,msk , id). P stores the tuple (U ,
id , aux) and includes id in a set I of user identifiers. P
stores the key part sk(id) in a tamper-resistant element
of the user mobile device.
• U sends age to P through an authenticated channel.
• P verifies the certified age age . We leave open the way
the attribute age is verified.
• P creates a list (RO1, . . . , RON ) of right objects such
that the attribute age of U fulfills the rating rt of the
right object. P retrieves aux from the tuple (U , id , aux).
For each ROi , P runs sk(si) ← KeyGen1(aux, si) and
appends si to ROi .
• P runs (stp ,Minit) ← InitP(1k , RO1, p1, . . . , RON , pN ),
stores stp and sends Minit to U through an authenticated
channel.
• U receives Minit , runs (stu , p1, . . . , pN ) ← InitU(1k ,
Minit) and stores stu .
Payment Phase. The user U receives as input a payment p.
The provider P receives no input. The interaction between
U and P is as follows:
• U runs (stu ,Mpay) ← PayU(stu , p), updates the stored
stu and sends Mpay to P through an authenticated
channel.
• P receives Mpay and runs (stp , p) ← PayP(stp ,Mpay).
P updates the stored stp and verifies that a payment of
value p has been received through any existing payment
protocol.
Purchase Phase. The user U receives as input an index i
∈ [1,N ]. The provider P receives no input. The interaction
between U and P is as follows:
• U runs (stu ,Mreq) ← ReqU(stu , i), stores stu and sends
Mreq to P through an authenticated channel.
• P receives Mreq , runs stp ← ReqP(stp ,Mreq) and up-
dates the stored stp . P runs (stp ,Msell) ← SellP(stp),
updates the stored stp and sends Msell to U through an
authenticated channel.
• U receives Msell , runs (stu , ROi) ← SellU(stu ,Msell)
and updates the stored stu . U retrieves sk(si) from ROi ,
sets A ← A ∪ si and adds sk(si) to her secret key
sk(id ,A).
SEK Update Phase. The provider P receives as input a
channel policy P and a service encryption key SEK. The
channel policy allows any user to obtain the SEK if the user
possesses a secret key for the channel attribute. P and U do
the following:
• P retrieves the stored user identifier set I and runs
ct(I,P) ← Enc(par , I,P,SEK). P broadcasts the cipher-
text ct(I,P) to the users.
• A user U receives ct(I,P) and checks whether, for her
secret key sk(id ,A), id ∈ I and A  P. In that case, U
runs SEK ← Dec(par , sk(id ,A), ct(I,P)) and outputs
SEK.
Revocation Phase. The provider P receives as input the
identity U of a user. To revoke this user, P retrieves id from
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Table of Symbols for BABE (left) and POT (right)
 Satisfy P Policy
1k Security parameter par Public parameters
A Attribute set Q Universe of policies
aux Auxiliary information s Attribute
ct(I,P) Ciphertext S Universe of attributes
I User indices set sk(id) Secret key - identity part
id User index sk(s) Secret key - attribute part
m Message sk(id ,A) Secret key
msk Master secret key U Universe of user indices
1k Security parameter p Value of payment
i Message index P Provider
m Message p Price
M Message space stp State information for P
Minit Initialization message stu State information for U
Mpay Payment message U User
Mreq Request message Uac Universe of accounts
Msell Sell message Upr Universe of prices
N Number of messages
the stored tuple (U , id , aux) and sets I← I \ id .
The provider P establishes subscription periods of, e.g.,
one year. At the beginning of a new period, P changes the
identifiers of the channel attributes si and the corresponding
policies P used to encrypt the SEK. Therefore, at the begin-
ning of a new period, users must renew their subscriptions
by running the POT protocol to obtain key parts sk(si) for
the new channel attributes si in order to be able to obtain
the updated SEK’s. We note that the key part sk(id) does not
need to be updated. We also note that a user can subscribe
to a channel at any time. If the subscription is not carried
out at the beginning of the subscription period, the prices of
the channels are adjusted for the remaining of the period.
6 PAY-PER-VIEW CAS
In our pay-per-view CAS (PPV-CAS), the key stream and
traffic encryption layers remain as in the DVB standard,
which we briefly describe in Section 2. A user U needs only
one SEK to decrypt the TEK’s throughout the broadcast. The
SEK is also updated every week, but we consider that TV
programs last shorter.
Through the rights management layer, a user obtains
right objects, which contain the SEK, for TV programs of her
choice. The rights management layer uses priced oblivious
transfer to let users purchase right objects without revealing
the TV programs bought to the provider.
The protocol consists of an initialization phase, a pay-
ment phase and a purchase phase. Basically, it consists on
executing a POT protocol where the provider sells right
objects that contain the SEK of TV programs.
Initialization Phase. The user U receives as input a certified
age age . The provider P receives as input a list of right
objects RO. Each right object ROi contains a program
attribute si , the SEK, a price pi and a rating rt i . The rating
indicates the minimum age age a user must have in order to
be allowed to buy a TV program. The interaction between
U and P is as follows:
• U sends age to P through an authenticated channel.
• P verifies the certified age age . We leave open the way
the attribute age is verified.
• P creates a list (RO1, . . . , RON ) of right objects such
that the attribute age of U fulfills the rating rt of the
right object. P runs (stp ,Minit) ← InitP(1k , RO1, p1,
. . . , RON , pN ), stores stp and sends Minit to U through
an authenticated channel.
• U receives Minit , runs (stu , p1, . . . , pN ) ← InitU(1k ,
Minit) and stores stu .
Payment Phase. The payment phase works as the payment
phase of our PPC-CAS in Section 5.
Purchase Phase. The user U receives as input an index i
∈ [1,N ]. The provider P receives no input. The interaction
between U and P is as follows:
• U runs (stu ,Mreq) ← ReqU(stu , i), stores stu and sends
Mreq to P through an authenticated channel.
• P receives Mreq , runs stp ← ReqP(stp ,Mreq) and up-
dates the stored stp . P runs (stp ,Msell) ← SellP(stp),
updates the stored stp and sends Msell to U through an
authenticated channel.
• U receives Msell , runs (stu , ROi) ← SellU(stu ,Msell)
and updates the stored stu . U retrieves the SEK con-
tained in ROi .
7 DISCUSSION OF OUR CAS
We discuss the properties of our pay-per-view and our pay-
per-channel CAS.
Privacy. The user privacy property of the priced oblivious
transfer scheme guarantees that the service provider does
not learn any information on the TV channels for which a
user subscribes.
Revocation. The BABE scheme employs a direct revocation
method. P associates each user to a user index id . Each user
receives a secret key that allows to decrypt ciphertexts that
include id . P , who knows the revocation list, encrypts the
SEK of each channel on input the list of non-revoked users.
A revoked user will not be able to obtain the next SEK for
that channel, which is updated weekly. Therefore, our CAS
provides backward secrecy.
Collusion Resistance. The BABE scheme also ensures that
users cannot collude to gain access to channels that they
cannot access on their own. The user secret keys in a
BABE scheme cannot be combined to obtain a secret key
that encompasses the attributes of each of the secret keys.
Additionally, by storing the key part sk(id) in a tamper-
resistant element, a user is prevented from sharing her key.
Non repudiation. For POT schemes, the problem of non
repudiation has been addressed in [33], which provides a
method to turn any POT scheme into a POT scheme that
offers fair exchange. This method can be applied to our POT
scheme, so that, at the end of a purchase, P gets a signature
by U that acknowledges that the purchase has been made,
while U receives a signature by P that acknowledges that
the payment was received. These signatures should be used
in case of a dispute between P and U .
Low Storage Overhead. The storage overhead of our pay-
per-channel CAS requires the storage of a BABE secret key
7Provider Setup User
(par ,msk)← Setup(1k ) par - Store par
Provider Initialization User
Input: (RO1, . . . , RON ′) Input: age
(sk(id), aux)← KeyGen0(par ,msk , id) sk(id) - Store sk(id)
Verify and store age ageﬀ
Pick (RO1, . . . , RON ) satisfied by age
{sk(si)← KeyGen1(aux, si)}Ni=1
{Append sk(si) to ROi}Ni=1
(stp ,Minit)← InitP(1k , RO1, p1, . . . , RON , pN ) Minit - (stu , p1, . . . , pN )← InitU(1k ,Minit)
Provider Payment User
Input: p
(stp , p)← PayP(stp ,Mpay) Mpayﬀ (stu ,Mpay)← PayU(stu , p)
Provider Purchase User
Input: i
stp ← ReqP(stp ,Mreq) Mreqﬀ (stu ,Mreq)← ReqU(stu , i)
(stp ,Msell)← SellP(stp) Msell - (stu , ROi)← SellU(stu ,Msell)
sk(si)← ROi , A← A ∪ si , sk(id ,A)← sk(id ,A) ∪ sk(si)
Provider SEK Update User
Input: SEK, P
ct(I,P)← Enc(par , I,P, SEK) ct(I,P) - SEK← Dec(par , sk(id ,A), ct(I,P))
Provider Revocation User
Input: id
I← I \ id
Fig. 3. Our Pay-Per-Channel CAS.
for a user identifier id and for the TV channels to which the
user has subscribed, and of one SEK for each TV channel
to which the user has subscribed. Our pay-per-view CAS
requires to store one SEK for each purchased TV program.
Key Redistribution. Our scheme enjoys efficient key re-
distribution when a user is revoked. Thanks to the use
of a direct revocation method, other users do not need to
perform any operation. Users only need to renew their keys
at the beginning of each subscription period, e.g., every year.
We note that this update does not involve the key part stored
in the tamper-resistant element of the mobile device.
Broadcast Efficiency. We note that, in our pay-per-view
CAS, U and P need to run a POT protocol, which involves
one to one communication. However, other CAS also require
one to one communication so that U communicates to P the
program purchased and gets the SEK. After getting the SEK,
both our CAS and other CAS enjoy broadcast transmission
efficiency. In our pay-per channel CAS, U and P run a
POT protocol when U subscribes to a channel. Other CAS
also involve one to one communication in the subscription
phase, where U communicates to P the TV channels to
which she wishes to subscribe. After that, our scheme enjoys
broadcast efficiency because the ciphertexts that encrypt the
RO are the same for all the users and can thus be broadcast.
Broadcast Anonymity. We note that the privacy provided
by our pay-per-view and pay-per-channel CAS is lost if
the video content is transmitted on demand rather than
being broadcast to users. In that case, users can employ an
anonymous communication network [34] to access the video
content in order to protect their privacy.
Fine-Grained Access Control. The BABE scheme allows the
provider P to apply fine-grained access control. In our pay-
per-channel CAS, the provider enforces a simple policy that
requires users to subscribe to a channel. However, the BABE
scheme allows to apply any policy described by a CNF or
DNF formula, and threshold predicates, which allows the
provider to enforce more complex access control policies.
In Table 3, we compare the features of our PPC-CAS
with those of the PPC-CAS in [4] and [10]. As can be seen,
the main advantages of our CAS in comparison with those
in [4] and [10] are that our CAS provides user privacy and
efficient key redistribution. The former is due to the use of
POT, which allows users to subscribe to channels without
revealing the channels they purchase to the provider. The
latter is due to the use of BABE, which allows for a revo-
cation method in which non-revoked users do not need to
update their keys.
We use the symbol ⊥ for properties that none of the
analyzed PPC-CAS attains, but that can be achieved by
extending them with suitable tools. The non-repudiation
claim of [4] is not completely sound. They should use a
signature scheme or message authentication code to prove
8TABLE 3
Feature comparison of our CAS with those in [4] and [10].
Our CAS [4] [10]
Privacy Yes No No
Revocation Yes Yes Yes
Collusion Resistance Yes Yes Yes
Non-repudiation ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
Efficient Key Redistribution Yes No No
Broadcast Efficiency Yes Yes Yes
Broadcast Anonymity ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
Fine-grained access control Yes Yes Yes
that the ciphertexts are not tampered. In our CAS, broadcast
anonymity can be achieved by using an anonymous com-
munication network. Non-repudiation can be achieved by
using digital signature schemes and fair exchange protocols.
8 PRICED OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER
8.1 Building Blocks of Our POT Protocol
Bilinear Maps. Let G1, G2 and GT be groups of prime order
p. A map e : G1 × G2 → GT must satisfy bilinearity, i.e.,
e(gx, g˜y) = e(g , g˜)xy ; non-degeneracy, i.e., for all generators
g ∈ G1 and g˜ ∈ G2, e(g , g˜) generates GT ; and efficiency,
i.e., there exists an efficient algorithm BMSetup(1k ) that
outputs the pairing group setup (p,G1,G2,GT , e, g , g˜) and
an efficient algorithm to compute e(a, b) for any a ∈ G1,
b ∈ G2.
Non-Interactive ZKPK. Let R be a polynomial time com-
putable binary relation. For tuples (wit , ins) ∈ R we call
wit the witness and ins the instance. Let L be the NP-
language consisting of the instances ins for which there
exist witnesses wit such that (wit , ins) ∈ R. A non-
interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (NIPK) sys-
tem for R consists of the algorithms PKSetup, PKProve and
PKVerify. On input a security parameter 1k, PKSetup(1k)
outputs the parameters parPK . PKProve(parPK ,wit , ins)
checks whether (wit , ins) ∈ R and in that case outputs a
proof pi. PKVerify(parPK , ins, pi) outputs 1 if pi is a valid
proof that ins ∈ L or 0 if that is not the case. A NIPK
system must fulfill the zero-knowledge and simulation-
sound extractability properties [35].
Signatures. A signature scheme consists of the algorithms
KeyGen, Sign, and VfSig. KeyGen(1k ) outputs a secret key
sk and a public key pk , which include a description of
the message space M. Sign(sk ,m) outputs a signature s
on a message m ∈ M. VfSig(pk , s,m) outputs 1 if s is a
valid signature on m and 0 otherwise. This definition can
be extended to blocks of messages m¯ = (m1, . . . ,mn). In
this case, KeyGen(1k ,n) receives the maximum number of
messages as input. A signature scheme must be existentially
unforgeable [36].
Commitments. A commitment scheme consists of the algo-
rithms CSetup, Com and VfCom. CSetup(1k ) generates the
parameters parc , which include a description of the message
space M and of the randomness space R. Com(parc , x ,
open) outputs a commitment com to x ∈ M and random
value open ∈ R. VfCom(parc , com, x , open) outputs 1 if
com is a commitment to x ∈ M and random value open
∈ R or 0 otherwise. A commitment scheme must fulfill the
hiding and binding properties [37].
8.2 Our Priced Oblivious Transfer Scheme
Our construction POT for priced oblivious transfer involves
a provider P and a user U and is parameterized by a mes-
sage space M = G1, a number of messages N , a universe
of prices Upr = [0, pmax] and a universe of accounts Uac =
[0, acmax], where acmax = pmax ·N . Construction POT uses
a commitment scheme (CSetup, Com, VfCom), a signature
scheme (KeyGen1, Sign1, VfSig1) that signs messages in
G1 and G2, a signature scheme (KeyGen2, Sign2, VfSig2)
that signs messages in Zp, a double trapdoor public-key
encryption scheme, and a NIPK scheme (PKSetup, PKProve,
PKVerify) for the relations R1, R2 and R3 described in
our construction. We employ a NIPK scheme where the
setup algorithm PKSetup is common for those relations. Our
scheme uses a common references string, which is computed
by a trusted party as follows.
• Run Φ = (p,G1,G2,GT , e, g , g˜) ← BMSetup(1k),
parc ← CSetup(1k) and parPK ← PKSetup(1k).
• Pick random a, b, c ← Zp and set (h1, h2, h3, h˜1 , h˜2 ,
h˜3 ) = (g
a , gb , gc , g˜a , g˜b , g˜c).
• Set crs ← (Φ, h1, h2, h3, h˜1 , h˜2 , h˜3 , parc , parPK ).
The crs is used by P and U . In the following, we describe
the algorithms of our scheme.
InitP(1k ,m1, p1, . . . ,mN , pN ).
• P picks random x1, x2 ← Zp and sets (w1,w2) = (h1/x13 ,
h
1/x2
3 ) and (w˜1, w˜2) = (h˜
1/x1
3 , h˜
1/x2
3 ).
• P runs KeyGen1(1k, 3) to obtain (pk1, sk1) and
KeyGen2(1
k, 1) to obtain (pk2, sk2).
• For i = 1 to N , P picks r1, r2 ← Zp, runs si
← Sign1(sk1, 〈w r11 ,w r22 , g˜pi 〉) and sets ti ← (w r11 ,w r22 ,
hr11 , h
r2
2 ,mi · hr1+r23 , si , pi). The tuple (w r11 ,w r22 , hr11 , hr22 ,
mi · hr1+r23 ) is a double trapdoor encryption of mi .
• For j = 0 to acmax, P runs s ′j ← Sign2(sk2, j).
• P sets com ← ⊥ and stp ← (x1, x2, w˜1, w˜2, pk1, pk2,
com).
• P sets Minit ← (w1,w2, w˜1, w˜2, pk1, pk2, 〈s ′j〉acmaxj=0 , t1,
. . . , tN 〉).
• P outputs (stp ,Minit).
InitU(1k ,Minit).
• For j = 0 to acmax, U aborts if 1 6= VfSig2(pk2, s ′j , j).
• For i = 1 to N , U parses ti as (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, si , pi)
and aborts if pi /∈ Upr , or if 1 6= VfSig1(pk1, 〈c1, c2, g˜pi 〉,
si), or if e(c1, h˜1 ) 6= e(c3, w˜1), or if e(c2, h˜2 ) 6= e(c4,
w˜2).
• U sets stu ← (w1,w2, w˜1, w˜2, pk1, pk2, 〈s ′j〉acmaxj=0 , t1, . . . ,
tN , ac ← 0, com ← ⊥, open ← ⊥).
• U outputs (stu , p1, . . . , pN ).
PayU(stu , p).
• U aborts if p + ac /∈ [0, acmax].
• If com = ⊥ and open = ⊥, U sets open ′ ← 0, else picks
random open ′ ← R.
• U sets ac′ ← ac + p, runs com ′ ← Com(parc , ac′,
open ′), picks l1, l2 ← Zp and encrypts p as (c1, c2, c3)←
(w l11 ,w
l2
2 , p · h l1+l23 ).
9• If com 6= ⊥ and open 6= ⊥, U sets ins ← (parc , com,
com ′, p, pk2) and wit ← (ac, ac′, s ′ac′ , open, open ′), and
runs pi ← PKProve(parPK ,wit , ins) for the relation
R1 = {(ins,wit) : 1 = VfCom(parc , com, ac, open) ∧
1 = VfCom(parc , com
′, ac′, open ′) ∧ ac′ = ac + p ∧
1 = VfSig2(pk2, ac
′, s ′ac′)}
• U replaces (ac, com, open) in stu by (ac′, com ′, open ′).
• If com = ⊥ and open = ⊥, U sets Mpay ← (c1, c2, c3),
else sets Mpay ← (pi, com ′, c1, c2, c3〉).
• U outputs stu and Mpay .
PayP(stp ,Mpay).
• If com = ⊥, P parses Mpay as (c1, c2, c3), else parses
Mpay as (pi, com ′, c1, c2, c3).
• P decrypts p ← c3/(cx11 cx22 ).
• If com 6= ⊥, P sets ins ← (parc , com, com ′, p, pk2) and
aborts if 1 6= PKVerify(parPK , ins, pi).
• If com = ⊥, P sets open ′ ← 0 and runs com ′ ←
Com(parc , p, open
′).
• P replaces com by com ′ in stp .
• P outputs stp and p.
ReqU(stu , i).
• U aborts if i /∈ [1,N ] or if stu contains the values (i ′, y1,
y2, d1, d2).
• U parses ti as (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, si, pi) and aborts if ac <
pi .
• U picks random y1, y2 ← Zp and computes (d1, d2) ←
(c1 · wy11 , c2 · wy22 ) and (u1, u2)← (hy13 , hy23 ).
• U sets ac′ ← ac − pi , picks random open ′ ← R and
computes com ′ ← Com(parc , ac′, open ′).
• U sets ins ← (parc , com, com ′, pk1, pk2, d1, d2, h˜3 , w˜1,
w˜2) and wit ← (ac, ac′, open, open ′, pi , si , s ′ac′ , c1, c2,
u1, u2) and runs pi ← PKProve(parPK ,wit , ins) for a
relation
R2 = {(ins,wit) : 1 = VfCom(parc , com, ac, open) ∧
1 = VfCom(parc , com
′, ac′, open ′) ∧ ac′ = ac − pi ∧
1 = VfSig1(pk1, 〈c1, c2, g˜pi 〉, si) ∧
1 = VfSig2(pk2, ac
′, s ′ac′) ∧
e(c1, h˜3 )e(u1, w˜1) = e(d1, h˜3 ) ∧
e(c2, h˜3 )e(u2, w˜2) = e(d2, h˜3 )}
• U sets stu ← stu ∪ (i , y1, y2, d1, d2).
• U sets Mreq ← (d1, d2, pi, com ′).
• U outputs stu and Mreq .
ReqP(stp ,Mreq).
• P aborts if stp contains the values (d ′1, d ′2).
• P sets ins ← (parc , com, com ′, pk1, pk2, d1, d2, h˜3 , w˜1,
w˜2) and aborts if 1 6= PKVerify(parPK , ins, pi).
• P replaces com by com ′ in stp and sets stp ← stp ∪ (d1,
d2).
• P outputs stp .
SellP(stp).
• P aborts if stp does not contain the values (d1, d2).
• P calculates (z1, z2)← (dx11 , dx22 ) and z ← z1 · z2.
• P sets ins ← (w˜1, w˜2, d1, d2, h˜3 , z ) and wit ← (z1, z2)
and runs pi ← PKProve(parPK ,wit , ins) for a relation
R3 = {(ins,wit) : e(z1, w˜1) = e(d1, h˜3 ) ∧
e(z2, w˜2) = e(d2, h˜3 ) ∧ e(z1, h˜3 )e(z2, h˜3 ) = e(z , h˜3 )}
• P deletes (d1, d2) from stp and sets Msell ← (z , pi).
• P outputs stp and Msell .
SellU(stu ,Msell).
• U aborts if stu does not store a tuple (i , y1, y2, d1, d2).
• U sets ins ← (w˜1, w˜2, d1, d2, h˜3 , z ) and aborts if 1 6=
PKVerify(parPK , ins, pi).
• U parses ti as (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, si , pi) and computes
mi ← c5/(z · h−y13 · h−y23 ).
• U deletes (i , y1, y2, d1, d2) from stu .
• U outputs stu and mi .
8.3 Security Analysis
In the full version, we prove that our construction POT
securely realizes our ideal functionality for priced oblivious
transfer FPOT in the universal composability framework.
Our construction is secure in a hybrid model where parties
in the real world use ideal functionalities for common
reference string FCRS.SetupCRS and for authenticated channels
FAUT.
The user privacy property holds if the commitment
scheme (CSetup, Com, VfCom) is hiding and if the scheme
(PKSetup, PKProve, PKVerify) is zero-knowledge and
sound. We note that soundness is implied by simulation-
sound extractability.
The sender security property holds if the scheme
(PKSetup, PKProve, PKVerify) is zero-knowledge and
simulation-sound extractable, if the signature schemes
(KeyGen1, Sign1, VfSig1) and (KeyGen2, Sign2, VfSig2) are
existentially unforgeable, if the double trapdoor encryption
scheme fulfills the property of indistinguishability under
chosen plaintext attack, and if the commitment scheme
(CSetup, Com, VfCom) is binding.
9 EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS OF OUR CAS
In this section we analyze the efficiency of our CAS propos-
als. Results for PPC-CAS are provided in Section 9.1, along
with a comparison to the scheme in [10]. The results for
PPV-CAS are summarized in Section 9.2.
Our platform selection for the provider side is an off-
the-shelf laptop running Linux on an Intel Core i5-3317U
CPU at 1.70 GHz. On the user side, we select a Beaglebone
Black equipped with a 32-bit ARM Cortex-A8 processor
and clocked at 1 GHz. This platform is representative of
mobile devices, as the same processor core can be found
in early-generation smartphones such as Apple iPhone 4,
Samsung Galaxy S or Google Nexus S. Our implementation
is coded in C language to ensure platform independence. We
leverage on the Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) library4
developed by Ben Lynn to implement bilinear maps. In
particular, we employ type A1 curves to instantiate the ABE
constructions and type D curves with a base field length of
4. https://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/
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201 bits and an embedding degree of 6 to instantiate the POT
constructions. Note that PBC can be ported and executed in
Android platforms, see e.g. [38], and thus we expect the
performance of an Android application to be very similar to
that of our Beaglebone implementation.
To instantiate the cryptographic building blocks of our
POT protocol, we employ the commitment scheme in [37]
for (CSetup, Com, VfCom), the signature scheme in [16] for
(KeyGen1, Sign1, VfSig1), and the weakly secure signature
scheme in [39] for (KeyGen2, Sign2, VfSig2). For the sake
of efficiency, to instantiate (PKSetup, PKProve, PKVerify),
we employ the Fiat-Shamir transform, which is simulation-
sound extractable in the random oracle model [40]. There-
fore, this instantiation does not achieve universal compos-
ability, which is achieved when using other simulation-
sound extractable NIPK scheme or the Groth-Sahai proof
system [41] in the manner of [15].
9.1 Efficiency Analysis of PPC-CAS
In Table 4, we summarize the performance results for each
phase of the PPC-CAS schemes. Results on the left hand side
of the table are given depending on the parameters of the
system, namely, the number of users |U |, the number of TV
channels |N |, the number of channels the user is subscribed
to |A|, and the average number of user subscriptions per
channel |I| . The results on the right hand side correspond
to a particular initialization of the system with |U | = 100k
users, |N | = 100 TV channels, |A| = 10 channels/user
(in average), and |I| = 10k users/channel (in average,
assuming uniform distribution). Note that in our scheme,
the value of |A| corresponds to the number of attributes.
This is however not the case in [10], where the number of
attributes is fixed to four.
In our scheme, the running time of the setup algorithm
is dominated by the number of users |U | which, at the same
time, determines the size of the public parameters. The run-
ning time of the key generation algorithm and the key size
grow with |A|, which in this case corresponds to the number
of attributes in BABE. More specifically, the execution time
of KeyGen0 is 50 ms and is independent of the number of
attributes, whereas the running time of KeyGen1 demands
0.8 ms for each user attribute. The running time of the POT
initialization phase is dominated by the loops iterating over
the number of messages N and the universe of accounts
Uac, which in our application correspond to the number
of channels |N | and users |U |, respectively. Timings on the
user side are significantly larger due to the use of a less
powerful computing platform, but also due to the fact that
our building blocks demand the computation of bilinear
maps during signature verification but not during signature
generation. The running times of the payment and purchase
algorithms are constant and independent of any parameter
of the scheme. The running time of the encryption algorithm
grows with the number of users |I| that have subscribed to
that particular channel. Note however that the ciphertext
size is constant at 1 040 bytes. Finally for decryption, the
running time grows similarly with |I|.
The comparison with the results obtained from the
scheme in [10] yields some clear differences. First, we ob-
serve that both running time and communication in the
setup algorithm are independent of any parameter in the
PPC-CAS construction and significantly lower than in our
scheme. Second, the complexity of the user registration
phase (i.e. invoking user key generation) increases with |A|.
This is the same behaviour as our PPC-CAS, yet in this
case the scheme in [10] performs worse. Third, the payment
and purchase algorithms are not present in the comparison,
since, in contrast to our work, the scheme in [10] does not
protect users’ privacy and therefore omits any description
of the payment mechanisms. Finally we observe that only
the encryption algorithm depends on |I|, and that both
encryption and decryption are more costly than in our
scheme. Moreover, the CAS in [10] needs key updates for
revocation purposes.
In summary, except for the setup phase, our CAS is more
efficient. The reason is that our CAS uses BABE, which pro-
vides an efficient direct revocation method. The CAS in [10]
needs to include attributes for revocation purposes in the
user keys and in the ciphertexts, which affects negatively the
efficiency of the user registration and SEK update phases.
Independently of this observation, the results provided
in Table 4 prove that our PPC-CAS scheme is practical.
The time required for encrypting and decrypting the SEK
is perfectly assumable, and the size of the ciphertext that is
broadcast is only 1040 bytes. Recall that the SEK is updated
weekly. The most time consuming result corresponds to
the verification for U , which requires over 2 hours for
|U | = 100k. While this seems a prohibitive result, we note
that, in practice, at initialization the mobile pay-tv users
receive the same message from the provider. Therefore, the
verification step can be carried out by a trusted authority.
The authority can verify the message once, compute its
hash and sign the hash. That way, each user only needs to
compute the hash of the message and verify the signature
computed by the authority.
9.2 Efficiency Analysis of PPV-CAS
The results of our PPV-CAS implementation are summa-
rized in Table 5 (initialization phase) and Table 6 (payment
and purchase phases). Recall that our PPV-CAS leverages
on POT to achieve privacy but, in contrast to our PPC-CAS
scheme, it does not rely on BABE.
Similar to the case of PPC-CAS, the running time of
the initialization phase is dominated by the loops iterat-
ing over the number of messages N and the universe of
accounts Uac. We give in Table 5 and overview of the
timings for exemplary values of acmax and N . Independent
of the parameter selections, we stress once again that the
verification can be outsourced to a third party in a real
setting. Results for the post-initialization phases of our PPV-
CAS scheme are given in Table 6. The execution times
and communication overhead of each phases are perfectly
assumable. The payment and the sell phases require in
particular less than 1 second to execute, and the request
phase is completed within 2.5 seconds. The bottleneck for
each phase corresponds to proving the relations R1, R2
and R3, respectively. The length of the messages exchanged
between U and P during a purchase is below 2 kbytes.
All in all, it is once again clear from the results that
deploying our PPC-CAS scheme in mobile TV settings is
perfectly feasible.
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TABLE 4
Performance analysis of our PPC-CAS and comparison.
Protocol Phase Timings Communication Timings Communication
(in ms) (in bytes)
P U P ↔ U P U P ↔ U
OUR SCHEME
SETUP
Setup 50|U | — 2 401 + 50|U | 5 000 s — 4 885 Kbytes
InitP,InitU 100|N |+ |U | 882|N |+ 78|U | 1040|N |+ 52|U | 110 s 7 888 s 5 180 Kbytes
USER REGISTRATION
KeyGen0,KeyGen1 50 + 0.8|A| — 520 + 260 · |A| 58 ms — 3 120 bytes
PAYMENT
PayU,PayP 61 462 288 61 ms 462 ms 288 bytes
PURCHASE
ReqU,ReqP 174 2 390 1 235 174 ms 2 390 ms 1 235 bytes
SellP,SellU 71 720 491 71 ms 720 ms 491 bytes
SEK UPDATE
Enc 106 + 0.016|I| — 1 040 266 ms — 1 040 bytes
Dec — 1 580 + 0.16|I| — — 3 180 ms —
SCHEME [10]
SETUP 140 — 1 560 140 ms — 1 560 bytes
USER REGISTRATION 2 352 · |A| — 2 340 · |A| 23.5 s — 23 400 bytes
SEK UPDATE
Enc 2 380 — 3 120 2 380 ms — 3 120 bytes
Dec — 59 040 — — 59 s —
TABLE 5
PPV-CAS: Initialization phase.
PARAMETERS TIMINGS COMMUNICATION
acmax N P U P ↔ U
10 k
50 15 s 824 s 559 kbytes
100 20 s 868 s 610 kbytes
200 30 s 956 s 711 kbytes
100 k
50 105 s 7 844 s 5 129 kbytes
100 110 s 7 888 s 5 180 kbytes
200 120 s 7 976 s 5 282 kbytes
TABLE 6
PPV-CAS: Payment, request and sell phases.
INTERFACE TIMINGS COMMUNICATION
P U P ↔ U
Payment Phase 61 ms 462 ms 288 bytes
Request Phase 174 ms 2 390 ms 1 235 bytes
Sell Phase 71 ms 720 ms 491 bytes
10 CONCLUSION
We proposed a pay-per-view and a pay-per-channel CAS
that protect user privacy. Both our CAS employ priced
oblivious transfer to allow the user to purchase programs
and to subscribe to channels without disclosing sensitive
information to the service provider. Our pay-per-channel
CAS also employs broadcast attribute-based encryption,
which provides broadcast efficiency, simple revocation, low
storage overhead and protection against user collusion. Our
implementation shows that our CAS is perfectly feasible for
mobile devices.
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